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Abstract: This paper investigates the credibility of performance measurement
from the evidence of a link between CEO incentive compensation and CEOs’
overstatement of their firms’ earnings, measured by stock return sensitivities to
firms’ earnings announcements. It empirically analyzes whether the stock market
response to announced earnings is positively related to the CEO’s performance
pay. It appears that stock return sensitivities to firms’ earnings announcements
increased with CEO pay-performance ratio in all earnings categories. Using stock
return sensitivities as indicators of a CEO’s overstatement of firm earnings, this
suggests not only that such overstatements exist, but also that overstatements
are more severe among CEOs with high incentive compensation. This suggests
that performance measurements based on performance pay are not credible. In
addition to tightening market monitoring, regulatory authorities should develop
measures that can reduce overstatement, such as making CEO compensation
better linked to long-term performance, which is more difficult to embellish.
Keywords: CEO incentive compensation, earnings overstatement, stock return
sensitivities
INTRODUCTION
Economists have largely welcomed strong performance pay for managers, such as
bonuses, large grants of stocks and stock options, as a good corporate governance
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practice (Holmstrom, 1982; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Gibbons & Murphy, 1992),
finding that higher shares of equity and of equity-based managers’ compensation
added more value to firms (Mehran, 1995).
Such incentive compensation has been widely used for various classes of employees
in various organizations, including for high-level government officials and in many
public entities. However, the credibility of performance measurement has often been
impaired due to efforts by firms or even public entities to manipulate it when incentive
compensation is based on it.
Corporate scandals such as those involving Enron and Worldcom have demonstrated
how performance measurement loses credibility when chief executive officers (CEOs)
overstate performance to inflate their firms’ stock prices.1
At Enron, the performance-based pay for the top five executives was extremely high
(91.86 percent of total compensation in 1996, 96.65 percent in 2000).2 This exceptional
level of performance pay probably contributed to the scandals that followed, and this
type of performance measurement has lost credibility.
Introduction of such performance measurement based on performance pay might
lead to increases both in managers’ productive efforts and in overstatements of perfor-
mance. Theoretical and empirical studies of the effect of performance pay on over-
statements by managers have increased. (For empirical studies, see for example Ke,
2002; Gao & Shrieves, 2002; and Bergstresser & Philippon, 2003; for theoretical studies,
see Dye, 1988; Maggi & Rodriguez-Clare, 1995; and Crocker & Slemrod, 2005.)
Overstatement of performance is widespread and a serious problem in many sectors
of the economy.3 CEOs’ overstatement of their firms’ earnings can mislead not only
investors but also other agents in the market. Thus the detection of firms’ earnings
overstatements and the examination of their relation to CEOs’ performance pay is of
importance to a wide variety of agents in the economy, such as investors, auditors, and
government regulators. It is especially critical to government regulators, because fail-
ing to detect such overstatements has often caused disruption in the financial system
and even financial crisis.
This paper examines performance pay and the credibility of performance mea-
surement, based on the evidence for a link between CEO incentive compensation
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1. In an article in Business Week, Byrne et al. (2002) argue that “The tyranny of the daily
stock price has led to borderline accounting and in some cases, outright fraud. And why
not, when every upward tick of the stock means massive gains for option-rich executives?”
2. Source: Forbes 3/22/2002.
3. “Fraudulent accounting for earnings is to everyday business management what tax fraud, a
rare practice, is to everyday tax chiseling”—Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 2005.
and stock return sensitivities to firms’ earnings announcements. In particular, it
empirically analyzes whether the stock market response to a company’s announced
earnings is positively related to the CEO’s performance pay. A new indicator of a
CEO’s overstatement of his or her firm’s earnings is proposed, earnings surprise
sensitivities of stock returns (hereafter stock return sensitivities), which measures the
responsiveness (or elasticity) of stock returns with respect to true earnings surprise. It
also investigates how CEO tenure affects the level of overstatement of the firm’s
earnings announcement.
Under the assumption of rational market expectation, the effect of earnings category
(for example, good or bad news) determines the direction of movement in stock
prices, while the effect of the extent of overstatement determines their sensitivities.
For example, when a firm announces earnings that exceed the market’s expectation
(for example, the consensus of analysts’ forecasts), the stock price of the firm will rise
regardless of past efforts by the CEO. Since the market knows the level of each effort,
the stock price will rise more if the overstatement of earnings has been relatively small
than it will if the overstatement has been larger. Similarly, when a firm announces
earnings smaller than the market’s expectation, the stock price will fall—and it will
fall more if the overstatement of earnings has been larger.
The unexpected terms in earnings movement are measured by the true earnings
surprise, the gap between actual reported earnings and the consensus forecast by
analysts at the time. Thus, one approach is to measure stock return sensitivities, which
represent how the stock market responds to a given level of earnings surprise. Table 1
represents theoretical predictions for stock return sensitivities to firms’ earnings
announcements. For example, if stock return sensitivities are more responsive to an
earnings announcement when the earnings surprise is positive, this would imply that
CEOs whose pay-performance ratios are high make relatively smaller overstatements
in true performance.
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Table 1. Theoretical Predictions of Stock Return Sensitivities
Pay-performance ratios Firm’s performance (y) Relative extent of overstatement Stock return sensitivities
m
High High –– : Low (more sensitive)
y
m
High Low –– : High (more sensitive)
y
Pay-performance ratios represent the portion of CEO compensation tied to performance. Stock return sensitivities represent
the change in stock returns divided by the earnings surprise. They are only observable ex-post.
Using data from Compustat, Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System, the Center for
Research in Security Prices, and Compustat Executive Compensation for the period
from 1997 to 2007, this study measures stock return sensitivities to firms’ earnings
announcements, and CEOs’ pay-performance ratios, which compare all performance-
related components—such as bonus, net value of stock options exercised, and long-
term incentive pay-outs—to total compensation. The empirical results support the
theoretical predictions that the relative extent of overstatement by the CEO whose
pay-performance ratio is high becomes smaller when the firm’s performance is good.
In this case, CEOs with high pay-performance ratios are less likely to be involved in
overstatement. The resulting stock return sensitivity is high. Similarly, when the firm’s
performance is bad, CEOs with high pay-performance ratios are more likely to be
involved in overstatement. Thus, stock return sensitivity is high in such cases as well.
An important advantage of this approach is that it does not require the direct mea-
surement of overstatement of a firm’s earnings. In contrast, many previous studies
have used discretionary accrual as a proxy of overstatement (or earnings manipulation
in general) and studied how the monetary incentives of managers affect earnings man-
agement (e.g., Ke, 2002; Gao & Shrieves, 2002; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2003).
However, such an approach is subject to criticism and debate about whether accrual is
a good proxy (and if so, which type of accrual).4 Also, it does not consider the effect
of market expectations.
This study’s empirical evidence strongly supports that high performance pay exac-
erbates CEO overstatement. These findings are robust after controlling firm-fixed
effects. This suggests not only that there exist overstatements in firms’ earnings
announcements, but also that overstatements become more severe when the CEO’s
incentive compensation is high. Thus, performance measurement based on perfor-
mance pay is not credible. These findings further imply that regulatory authorities
should consider developing CEO incentive compensation policies that reduce the like-
lihood of overstatement, such as tightening market monitoring or at least deferring
incentive pay so that it is better linked to long-term performance.
The next section of the paper presents predictions based on a model in which
CEOs’ incentive to overstate earnings depends on their performance pay and their pri-
vate information. The following two sections set out the data and methodology on
which the analysis is based. Next, the results are discussed. The paper concludes with
a discussion of the implications of the results for future research and policy making.
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4. For a detailed discussion, refer to the methodology section.
PREDICTION AND HYPOTHESIS
Consider an environment in which it is in the interest of shareholders (principal)
and a CEO (agent) to improve a firm’s earnings under rational expectations of the
market. Suppose risk-neutral owners of the firm or shareholders propose a contract
consisting of a fixed amount of salary and performance-related terms determined by
the stock return to a risk-neutral CEO. Due to this introduction of the stock market
into the model, shareholders cannot fully commit to the amount of compensation to be
given to the CEO. The CEO initially puts productive effort into improving the firm’s
earnings, and this action is followed by the opportunity to overstate earnings with
costs.5
This study defines stock return sensitivities with respect to reported earnings per
share and investigates how those sensitivities respond to the change in a CEO’s pay-
performance ratio (PPR in the empirical specification). It measures how much the
stock return would change in response to unexpected earnings. The unexpected por-
tion of a firm’s earnings depends on the reported earnings. However, stock returns
associated with a firm’s earnings announcement fully reflect any available information
about earnings.6
Thus, for example, a small change in stock returns after a large earnings surprise
would mean that stock returns are not sensitive to the firm’s earnings announcement.
If there is no chance to overstate a firm’s earnings, stock return sensitivity is more
related to uncertainty about the long-run performance of the firm or anticipated future
problems. However, under rational market expectations, firms overstate their perfor-
mance. In this situation, stock return sensitivity can be linked to the relative extent of
overstatement in true performance.
The market uses stock returns to evaluate the effect of a CEO’s productive effort.
Once the CEO’s productive effort is greater than the overstatement effort revealed
ex-post, the resulting stock returns are more responsive when the announcements of
earnings are considered good. Similar logic can be applied to the case of bad news
about earnings.
Next, the study investigated the effect of a CEO’s pay-performance ratio (PPR) on
stock return sensitivities, which represent the relation between the relative extent of
overstatement and the firm’s true performance.7
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5. For a detailed model description, see Kwon and Yeo, 2009.
6. Mathematically, a CEO’s earnings report corresponds to the reported performance, ŷ, in
the model, and the stock price corresponds to the market performance, ỹ.
7. Assuming overstatement in earnings reports and rational market expectations, the stock 
The sign of the derivative of stock return sensitivities with respect to the pay-
performance ratio is positive.8 It implies that stock returns sensitivities increase with
CEO’s performance pay. Thus the relative extent of CEO’s overstatement is smaller
when the firm’s announced performance is good and larger when the firm’s announced
performance is bad.
This result may seem counterintuitive at first glance. The model predicts that as the
pay-performance ratio increases, a CEO will overstate more. Thus, one might think
that the stock price would respond less sensitively to the announced earnings. However,
if the market rationally discounts the announced earnings as the pay-performance ratio
increases, the percentage change in stock prices increases because the relative extent
of overstatement of earnings determines the percentage change in stock prices.9
Therefore, the sign of the derivative in the above with respect to the CEO’s pay-
performance ratio is expected to be positive, which is consistent with the prediction.
The resulting hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis: Under rational market expectations, stock return sensitivities to a
firm’s earnings announcement increase with the CEO’s pay-performance ratio.
METHODOLOGY
This section explains how the model predictions given in the previous section were
tested using data from Dow Jones Industrial companies. First, stock return sensitivities
associated with firms’ quarterly earnings announcements were calculated. The study
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return sensitivities can be defined as follows:
∂me (ŷ; β)
–––––––––
dỹ ŷ ∂me (ŷ; β) ŷ ∂ŷ




8. ––– > 0 Proof. See the Appendix.
∂β
9. In the model, a CEO’s overstatement increases his or her firm’s true earnings. Intuitively,
because the marginal cost of overstatement is increasing, when the firm’s earnings are
extremely high, the market believes the firm’s reported earnings cannot all be driven by the
CEO’s large overstatement. The market believes that the CEO puts relatively less over-
statement efforts in the reported earnings when she has the high pay-performance ratio. In
response, CEOs have more incentive to overstate when their firm’s true earnings are large,
because the market will discount relatively less at the margin.
used a modified event study in order to measure abnormal stock returns, which reflect
how much stock returns gain or lose for a specified time period due to the impact of
events (in this case, firms’ earnings announcements).
Since it is very difficult to directly measure a CEO’s overstatement, the study
focused on whether the stock market behaves as if it rationally expects CEOs to over-
state their firms’ earnings. An important advantage of this approach is that it does not
require the direct measurement of overstatement. Many previous studies have used dis-
cretionary accrual as a proxy of overstatement (or earnings management in general) and
studied how the monetary incentives of managers affect earnings management (e.g.,
Ke, 2002; Gao & Shrieves, 2002; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2003). However, this
approach is subject to the criticism that accrual may not be a good proxy (and the ques-
tion of what type of accrual, if any, to use). For example, Krishnan, Sankaraguruswamy,
and Shin (1999) argue that accrual is observable, not only to econometricians, but also
to the market. Therefore, if accrual is indeed a good measure of overstatement or earn-
ings management, CEOs cannot deceive the market and will not engage in costly earn-
ings management (see also Schipper, 1989). Thus, they build their tests based on the
skewness of the distribution of announced earnings. Similarly, McNichols and Wilson
(1988) test earnings management based on the provision for bad debts. Beneish (2001)
shows that even when accrual is used as a proxy, there exist wide variations and dis-
agreements on which type of accrual (for example, total accrual or discretionary accru-
al) should be used. Also, it does not consider the effect of market expectations.
Stock Return Sensitivities
Event studies were used repeatedly for every firm and every quarter in order to
measure abnormal stock returns due to earnings announcements (MacKinlay, 1997).10
Firms’ quarterly earnings announcements were used as the event. Each event window
consisted of two or three days before and after an earnings announcement and was
preceded by a 250-day estimation window (Hillmer & Yu, 1979; Lev, 1989).11
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10. Event studies are the most commonly used method in economics and finance for measuring
the impact of specific events.
11. In most academic event studies, a predetermined number of days are allowed for the stock
price to react to an announcement. For example, according to Lev (1989), the appropriate
length of event windows for earnings ranges from two days to as much as a year. Hillmer
and Yu (1979) find that the event window should end within hours of the initial announce-
ment. Since this sample is large enough to correct the market’s misperception, it is reason-
able to assume that the reaction of the stock market to an event lasts two or at most three
days based on price volatility and trading volume.
The market model is employed to calculate stock returns for firm i and quarter t:
Rit = α0i + α1i Rmt + εit (1)
where is mean return during the normal period, and noise εit, has the following proper-
ties: E(εit) = 0,Var(εit) = σ2εit. The ordinary least square (OLS) analysis provides unbi-
ased estimates since the size of samples is large enough. The resulting estimates of α0i
and α1i are used to calculate abnormal returns, indicating how much the stock return
rises or falls due to the events compared to mean normal returns. The abnormal returns
are the following:
ARit = Rit – α̂0i – α̂1i Rmt (2)
where is abnormal return associated with a firm’s earnings announcement. Adding
abnormal returns for each day of the event window provides cumulative abnormal
returns (CAR). They represent patterns that rise, fall, or remain constant when news
arrives.
For each event, stock return sensitivities are computed. In response to the unex-
pected portion of actual reported earnings, the change in cumulative abnormal stock
returns between the day before and the day after the announcement (or between the
day of the announcement and the day after it) is calculated as follows:
% change in stock returns ∑1i=0 ARi|η | = | ––––––––––––––––––––––––– | = | ––––––––––––––––––––––––– | (3)% change in earnings surpise REP_FCSTS – MED_FCSTS–––––––––––––––––––––––––abs (MED_FCSTS)
where the denominator measures the portion of announced earnings that are unexpected
based on the information provided by the analysts’ consensus, while the numerator
represents the change in stock returns for the three days around the announcement date
compared to the normal period. This measure is used after taking the absolute value
because the focus of the study is the responsiveness of stock returns to the earnings
surprise.
CEO Pay-Performance Ratio
In order to define CEO pay-performance ratios, the study uses two different mea-
sures.12 One, the ratio of incentive-related terms in compensation to total compensa-
tion (PPR1), is defined as follows:
144 Performance Pay and Credibility of Performance Measurement
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
SOPTEXER
PPR1 = –––––––––––––––––––––––––––– (4)
SOPTEXER + BONUS + SALARY
where PPR1 represents how much of value is realized from exercising options, com-
pared to the CEO’s total compensation and SOPTEXER is the net value realized from
exercising options.13 BONUS and SALARY are self-explanatory. This relation is more
focused on the dollar value increase in the CEO’s wealth from exercising options.
The second measure, PPR2, is defined as follows:
SOPTEXER + BONUS + LTIP
PPR2 = ––––––––––––––––––––––––– (5)
TDC2
where LTIP represents long-term payouts and TDC2 is total compensation including
options exercised. This pay-performance ratio shows how large a part performance-
related terms are of total compensation—which includes the net value of options exer-
cised (TDC2 in Compustat), consisting of salary, bonus, other annual compensation,
total value of restricted stock granted, net value of stock options exercised, long-term
incentive payouts, and all other compensation.
Since this study focuses on the degree of interrelationship between the perfor-
mance-related terms in CEO compensation (pay-performance ratios), all compensa-
tion related to CEO performance is taken into account to define these ratios, including
bonus, net value of stock options exercised, and long-term incentive payouts. The
study assumes that CEO compensation is evenly spread throughout a year because
only annual information on compensation is available. This assumption makes sense
because CEO contracts usually last for several years.
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12. Ideally, one should measure how much the wealth of a CEO increases for a given increase
in stock price. However, due to various unknown restrictions on stock options and stock
grants, this study uses the ratio of performance pay to total compensation as a proxy for
monetary incentives. The performance-related components are based on those used by
Jensen & Murphy (1990).
13. This represents the difference in value between the exercise price of the options and the
market price of the company’s stock on the date of exercise.
DATA AND ESTIMATION METHOD
Data
This study examines Dow Jones Industrial Average companies from January 1997
to December 2007 (a period of 11 years).14 The total number of companies is 37, but
only 30 companies are listed every year; some companies were replaced during the
sample period. The total number of observations is 1,169. Quarterly earnings per share
(EPS) data have been collected for the same period. CEO compensation data have
been extracted from the executive compensation data in the Compustat Industrial
database.
The sample is limited to firms that maintain the same fiscal year end, since CEO
compensation relates to the whole year. The pay-performance ratio for a CEO for a
specific year is computed based on annual compensation items, so that quarterly pay-
performance ratios are the same as the corresponding annual pay-performance ratio.
Actual (reported) forecasts and analysts’ consensus (median) forecasts are calculated
based on data from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System.15 Daily stock returns
and value-weighted market returns are from the Center for Research in Security Prices,
while reported earnings announcement dates have been taken from the Compustat
Industrial. Earnings surprise16 measures unexpected change in announced earnings
under the assumption that the analysts’ forecasts are unbiased and provide the best
prediction available of actual earnings.
Estimation Method
OLS regression results are reported using panel data. However, using panel data
has the potential to create problems with both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity,
with the latter posing a greater concern. With the 11-year sample period, the time
series is relatively long; however, with 37 sample firms, the cross section does not
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14. Sample firms are limited to Dow Jones Industrial companies because relatively large com-
panies have more detailed data regarding earnings forecasts and CEO compensation. But
the sample firms are drawn from a wide range of industries and market capitalizations,
which reduces any concern about sample clustering.
15. Since there is no significant difference between the actual forecasts (EPS) from COMPUSTAT
and that from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System, this study uses the actual EPS
from the latter database.
16. Earnings surprise is defined as the percentage difference between actual earnings and the
consensus (median value) of analysts’ forecasts.
contain much variation in firm characteristics, especially firm size. However, the
industry category and the size of firms show meaningful variation across the sample
firms. Therefore, robust standard errors and t-statistics are calculated.
In order to solve for the potential endogeneity problem in the degree of CEO incen-
tives, industry dummies are introduced as an instrument variable for the degree of per-
formance pay. In general, CEO compensation is more strongly tied to performance in
industries such as information technology and computer software than in manufactur-
ing industries. In this sense, industry dummies are necessarily included in the analysis.
Industry classification is not related to the extent of overstatement of earnings.
The study controls for how long the CEO has been in the position on the earnings
announcement date (TENURE), and for the category of earnings news (= reported
forecasts-consensus forecasts), the size of assets (in logarithm), and market returns as
published in the S&P 500 index.
A regression equation is constructed of the stock return sensitivities on the pay-
performance ratio in CEO compensation, CEO tenure, the interaction between pay-
performance ratio and CEO tenure, and other control variables. Then the following
OLS model can be estimated:
ηit = γ0 + γ1PPRit + γ2TENUREit + γ3EPS_DIFFit
+ γ4{PPR TENURE}it + γ5LASSTit + γ5SPRTRNit (6)
+ γ6yrdum* + γ7inddum* + εit
where ηit is stock return sensitivities for firm i in period t, specifically, the percentage
change in stock returns from the normal period to the announcement period divided by
the percentage change in earnings surprise for firm i in period t. PPRit is the pay-
performance ratio in CEO compensation, on which this paper focuses; TENUREit is
the number of months that the CEO has been in the position; {PPR TENURE}it is an
interaction term explaining the effect of CEO tenure combined with pay-performance
ratios on stock return sensitivities. EPS_DIFFit is the category of earnings, the differ-
ence between reported earnings and consensus earnings; LASSTit is the logarithm of
the total value of assets of firm i in period t; SPRTRNit is the S&P 500 index return;
and yrdum*, inddum* are dummy variables for years and for different industries,
which are categorized by the first two-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification)
number.
The following firm-fixed-effect model is also estimated for a robustness check:
ηit = δ0 + δ1PPRit + δ2TENUREit + δ3EPS_DIFFit
+ δ4{PPR TENURE}it + ξi + εit (7)
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for firm i and (quarterly) time t and where ξi is the firm-fixed effect. The study also
controls for firm size, S&P 500 index return, and category of earnings.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics for the key variables in the analysis are presented in table 2.
Panel A summarizes stock return sensitivities. The average cumulative abnormal
returns for CAR(0, 1) and CAR(–1, 1) are 0.28 percent and 0.41 percent, respectively.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Stock return sensitivities
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
CAR (0, +1) (%) 0.284 4.891 -30.24 22.86
CAR (–1, +1) (%) 0.411 5.196 -34.91 22.77
REPORTED_ EPS 1.037 3.267 -25.00 35.40
CONSENSUS_ EPS 1.088 3.284 -0.455 32.20
EARNINGS_SURPRISE (%) 3.015 86.70 -1.260 2,025
SRS0 0.906 1.630 0 23.43
SRS1 0.962 1.723 0 22.56
Panel B: CEO compensation
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
SALARY 1,295.61 523.51 349.99 4,000
BONUS 2,892.56 2,876.17 0 18,484.41
SOPTEXER 8,632.42 33,605.59 0 569,827.7
PPR1 0.345 0.338 0 0.989
PPR2 0.597 0.247 0.008 0.998
TENURE 68.87 69.54 6 456
SPRTRN (%) 0.013 1.209 -6.867 5.731
LASST 10.843 1.236 7.705 14.673
N = 1,169.
CAR0 (or CAR1) represents cumulative abnormal returns for the specific period, (0, +1) (or (-1, +1)) due to earnings
announcement for a firm-quarter.
Earnings surprise (%) is the percentage difference between actual reported EPS and analysts’ consensus EPS.
SRS0 (or SRS 1) measures stock return sensitivities as the cumulative abnormal return of CAR0 (or CAR1) divided by the
amount of earnings surprise.
SOPTEXER is the net value realized from exercising options.
PPR1 represents a CEO’s pay-performance ratio defined as the ratio of net value from exercising options to total compen-
sation for a firm-quarter. PPR2 is a CEO’s pay-performance ratio defined as the ratio of all incentive terms to total compen-
sation for a firm-quarter.
TENURE represents how many months a CEO has been in the current position.
SPRTRN refers to S&P 500 index returns, and LASST is log of total value of assets.
The average earnings surprise in the percentage term is 3.01 and the resulting stock
return sensitivities for CAR(0, 1), CAR(0, 1) represent an average of 0.906 and 0.962,
respectively.
Panel B summarizes CEO compensation and determinants affecting stock return
sensitivities. The average salary for the CEOs in the sample firms is $1.296 million
with the $0.523 million of standard deviation. The average bonus for the CEOs in the
sample firms is $2.892 million with the $2.876 million of standard deviation, which
indicates there is great variation of the size of bonus even among CEOs in the Dow
Jones Industrial companies. This variation is more prominent in the level of the net
value realized from exercising stock options, SOPTEXER with the mean of $8.632
million and with $33.605 million standard deviation. TENURE has an average of
68.87 months with the maximum of 456 months (or 38 years) and with the minimum
of only 6 months.
Table 3 presents the distribution of the sample firms by industry. Although more
than half (21) are categorized as manufacturing, the distribution of the sample compa-
nies by one-digit SIC code indicates that they are from a wide range of industries,
which reduces concerns about sample clustering.
Table 4 shows that the sample firms increased their use of CEO incentive compen-
sation (bonus and long-term incentive pay) significantly from 1997 to 2005 but not in
2006 and 2007.17 In contrast, the average tenure of CEOs clearly decreased from 1997
to 2007-from 83.7 months to 61.4 months, a 26.6 percent decrease.
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17. All the reported long-term incentive payments for 2007 were 0; regressions were analyzed
with and without these values, but the main results remained the same.
Table 3. Distribution of Sample Firms of One-Digit SIC Code
SIC code Industry description Firms in sample
2 Manufacturing-nondurables 11
3 Manufacturing-durables 10
4 Transportation and utilities 3
5 Wholesale and retail 5
6 Financial services 5
7 Business services 2
9 Nonclassifiable 1
Total number of firms 37 
Pair-wise correlations in table 5 show that stock return sensitivities are correlated
with CEO’s pay-performance ratio and other determinants as expected. Stock return
sensitivities are high for companies with CEOs who have high performance pay,
which is consistent with the theoretical prediction. CEO tenure is positively related
with the size of assets and with pay-performance ratios.
Ordinary Least Square and Fixed Effect Controlled Analyses
Table 6 shows the estimated effect of CEO’s pay-performance ratio on stock return
sensitivities.18 Panel A represents ordinary least square analysis. Column 1 presents
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18. PPR1, used in this calculation, focuses on an increase in a CEO’s wealth that results from 
Table 4. Trends in CEO Incentive Compensation
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
SALARY* 1,125.43 1,137.10 1,206.91 1,223.25 1,270.72 1,262.51 1,357.33 1,389.37 1,440.13 1,479.00 1,394.33
BONUS* 1,928.91 2,119.57 3,084.82 3,074.41 2,503.34 2,390.43 2,945.76 3,649.07 3,914.01 3,744.37 2,450.53
SOPTEXER* 7,586.32 24,714.61 9,813.08 16,140.56 8,765.22 2,993.32 4,552.72 5,871.41 3,282.46 5,759.85 6,858.75
LTIP* 1,181.07 1,511.99 1,526.01 1,975.81 1,170.77 1,115.01 1,211.38 1,576.92 1,963.97 471.74 NA
TENURE* 83.73 77.49 81.33 61.18 59.36 60.97 69.92 73.98 64.96 55.73 61.43
PPR1 0.4695 0.3759 0.3770 0.3895 0.3983 0.2718 0.2634 0.2202 0.2133 0.4019 0.4629
PPR2 0.6983 0.6445 0.6868 0.6351 0.5842 0.6257 0.6091 0.6187 0.6281 0.3831 0.3585
N 122 104 110 99 99 106 115 120 116 88 90
* Thousands of dollars.
Mean values are reported except for N. SOPTEXER is the net value realized from exercising options; LTIP is the long-term payout;
TENURE represents how many months a CEO has been in the current position.
Table 5. Correlation between Variables
SRS0 EPS_DIFF PPR1 TENURE LASST SPRTRN
SRS0 1.0000
EPS_DIFF 0.0187 1.0000
PPR1 0.1163*** 0.0326 1.0000
TENURE 0.0069 0.0213 0.2174*** 1.0000
LASST -0.0196 -0.0873*** 0.1010*** 0.1829*** 1.0000
SPRTRN 0.0039 0.0615 0.0012 0.0212 -0.0175 1.0000
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
the estimated coefficient of pay-performance ratio of 0.4348, which is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level. Column 2 presents similar results. This finding implies
that stock returns are more sensitive to CEOs with higher pay-performance ratios. In
other words, CEOs whose pay-performance ratios are higher are likely to make a more
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exercising stock options. The empirical results remain the same when PPR2 is used as
the pay-performance ratio. Unreported empirical results using CAR1 and PPR1 or PPR2
provide no different results from those in table 6.
Table 6. Stock Return Sensitivities to Earnings Announcements
Panel A: Ordinary least square analysis
Dep. var. = SRS0 1 2 3
PPR1 0.4348*** (2.98) 0.4771*** (3.19) 0.2925 (1.36)
TENURE -0.0009 (-1.28) -0.0020* (-1.74)
EPS_DIFF 0.0113(0.39) 0.0123(0.43) 0.0132 (0.46)
PPR1 TENURE 0.0025 (1.20)
LASST 0.0170 (0.39) 0.0244 (0.55) 0.0215 (0.49)
SPRTRN 1.445 (0.37) 1.607 (0.41) 1.437 (0.37)
SIC_2CODE 0.0045 (1.41) 0.0052 (1.60) 0.0052 (1.60)
CONST 0.0350 (0.07) -0.0432 (-0.09) 0.0541 (0.11)
Firm-fixed effect No No No
R2 0.06 0.06 0.07
Panel B: Firm-fixed effect analysis
Dep. var. = SRS0 1 2 3
PPR1 0.3912** (2.30) 0.4280** (2.43) 0.2231 (0.92)
TENURE -0.0008 (-0.81) -0.0019 (-1.42)
EPS_DIFF 0.0104 (0.37) 0.0146 (0.51) 0.0133 (0.46)
PPR1 TENURE 0.0028 (1.22)
LASST -0.4518*** (-3.85) -0.4706*** (-3.93) -0.4753*** (-3.97)
SPRTRN 0.0660 (0.02) 0.1933 (0.05) 0.0156 (0.00)
SIC_2CODE (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
CONST 5.670*** (4.42) 5.918*** (4.49) 6.036*** (4.57)
Firm-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
Standard errors are in parentheses. N = 1,169.
SRS0 represents stock return sensitivities measured as cumulative abnormal return divided by the amount of earnings
surprise; PPR1 represents CEO’s pay-performance ratio, defined as the ratio of net value from exercising options to total
compensation for a firm-quarter; TENURE is how many months the CEO has been in the position; EPS_DIFF represents the
difference between actual reported earnings and analysts’ consensus forecasts for a firm-quarter; LASST is the logarithm
of total value of assets for a firm; SPRTRN refers to S&P 500 Index returns.
*** significant at 1 % level; ** significant at 5 % level; * significant at 10 % level
productive effort when their firms’ earnings are good, while they are likely to make
more overstatements when their firms’ earnings are bad. As discussed above, this
result is consistent with theoretical predictions that firms overstate their earnings under
the assumption of rational market expectations.
Panel B shows firm-fixed effect analysis. These estimates are almost identical to
those in panel A, suggesting that the estimated pay-performance ratio effects do not
reflect omitted firm-fixed characteristics.
The study also estimates the effect of a CEO’s tenure. Panel A, column 3 above
presents an estimated coefficient of TENURE of -0.002, which is statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% level. In opposition to the effect of PPR1, a CEO’s tenure would
decrease stock return sensitivities. One may think that younger CEOs would be more
willing to overstate their firm’s earnings to improve their own reputation (if they do
not get caught), and that older CEOs would not need to overstate because they have
already established a reputation.19
However, panel B, column 6 shows no significant effect of tenure. The estimated
coefficient of the interaction between PPR1 and TENURE is no longer significant
with the firm-fixed effect controlled. Perhaps younger CEOs are also less willing to
overstate earnings because of the potential long-term damage if they are caught. Then,
similar to the effect of PPR1, a CEO’s tenure would increase the stock return sensitivi-
ties. So these two opposite effects (anticipation of benefit and harm to one’s reputa-
tion) may offset each other.20
For the firm characteristic variable, firm assets, as a proxy for firm size, is nega-
tively related to stock return sensitivities, which implies that larger firms do not or
cannot easily overstate earnings, in part because of strong market monitoring.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the credibility of performance measurement based on evi-
dence of the link between CEO incentive compensation and CEOs’ overstatement of
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19. Nam, Wang, and Zhang (2008) argue that managers with a low initial reputation are more
likely to speculate early in their careers, and those with a high initial reputation are more
likely to hedge. On the other hand, highly reputable managers have minimal career con-
cerns, and they engage in neither hedging nor speculation early in their careers.
20. This result might imply that TENURE may be related to firm-specific factors captured by
the firm-fixed effect. Thus, this study checked whether firms offer their own specific length
of tenure to CEOs, but the data do not support this possibility. The author appreciates an
anonymous referee’s comment on this issue.
their firms’ earnings. In order to analyze this relationship, it has proposed a new indi-
cator for overstatement: stock return sensitivities, which measure the responsiveness
(or elasticity) of stock returns with respect to true earnings surprise.
The credibility of performance measurement was tested by examining the relation-
ship between a CEO’s incentive compensation and stock returns sensitivity to the
firm’s earnings announcement. Departing from previous studies on CEOs’ incentive to
overstate their firms’ earnings, this study has shed light on the relation between CEO
performance pay and the credibility of performance measures.
This study found that stock returns’ sensitivity to firms’ earnings announcements
are likely to be greater when there is higher CEO performance pay. This finding
suggests not only that there are overstatements in firms’ earnings announcements, but
also that overstatements by CEOs with high incentive compensation are likely to be
more severe. Thus, performance measurement based on performance pay is not credi-
ble. Empirical analysis reveals consistent evidence to support assertions by policy
makers that incentives consisting of stock-based compensation and the resulting equity
holdings increase the likelihood of overstatement.
This finding further implies that regulatory authorities and policy makers should
pay more attention to controlling overstatements, which are induced by CEOs’ incen-
tive compensation schemes. For example, increased market discipline would reduce
such overstatements, and therefore the authorities should implement policy measures
to toughen market monitoring. Also, the authorities should develop other measures
that can reduce overstatements, such as deferring incentive pay, so that CEO compen-
sation is better linked to long-term performance, which is more difficult to embellish.
Sustained efforts by firms and authorities remain necessary to effectively align com-
pensation structures with efforts to reduce the moral hazard.
Further research is needed on the effect of CEOs’ incentive compensation on the
extent of overstatement by considering detailed firm effects to control for potential
correlated omitted variables pertaining to CEO- and firm-specific characteristics. For
instance, Murphy (1985) suggests that contracted CEO compensation depends upon
the CEO’s opportunity costs, which in turn are related to factors such as education and
training, perceived ability, and performance in previous jobs.21
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21. The board of directors’ decision to grant a CEO stock-based compensation is also likely
to reflect the effectiveness of alternative corporate governance mechanisms (such as the
presence of outside board members and a large number of outside block holders). Unfor-
tunately, detailed information on CEO characteristics and on the structure of the board of
directors was not available for analysis during this study.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF FOOTNOTE 8
∂η(ŷ;β) ∂2me(ŷ;β) me(ŷ;β) ∂2me(ŷ;β) 1 ∂2me(ŷ;β)
sign{––––––}=[– ––––––––][1 – ––––––]– [1 – ––––––––][– –– ––––––––]∂β ∂β∂ŷ ŷ ∂ŷ ŷ ∂β
(A1)
From the relation of me(ŷ)
β kmme(ŷ) = –– [1 – exp (– –– ŷ)] (A2)km β
∂me(ŷ;β) km–––––––– = exp (– –– ŷ) (A3)∂ŷ β
∂2me(ŷ;β) kmŷ km–––––––– = ––– exp (– –– ŷ) (A4)∂β∂ŷ β2 β
∂me(ŷ;β) 1 km β kmŷ km–––––––– = –– [1 – exp (– –– ŷ)] + –– [– –––– exp (– –– ŷ)] (A5)∂β km β km β2 β
kmDefine χ = –– ŷ,
β
∂η(ŷ;β) χ 1 1 1
sign{––––––}=[– ––e–χ][1– –– (1–e–χ)] – –– [1–e–χ] [– –– (1–e–χ)–e–χ) ]∂β β χ β χ
1
= ––– (e–2χ – 2e–χ + 2χe–χ – 2χe–2χ – χ–2e–χ + 1) > 0 (A6)
χβ
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